

inadvisable this juncture implement plan outlined Embtel 57. Particularly coming at this time, public knowledge that US shipping significant military items Israel would add fuel to intensified Egyptian propaganda that recent US action in Egypt result of pro-Israel and anti-Arab policies. Shipments by US and Canada might be assumed widely to be in retaliation for nationalization Suez Canal and indicative open support for Israel in its dispute with Arab states. Settlement Suez issue would then become more difficult." Telegram 42 also expressed the hope that the Canadians would defer action on the F-86's and it instructed Merchant to ask Pearson not to inform the Israeli Ambassador of the Canadian decision, if Pearson had not already done so. (*Ibid.*) At the same time the Department cabled Ambassador Dillon: "We urge French reconsider their proposal deliver 24 additional Mysteres Israel at this time. Announcement as proposed by French would add to Arab claim recent actions of West including Aswan Dam decision motivated by pro-Israel policies, and would further complicate settlement of grave Suez Canal problem. Until situation clarifies and other elements possible Western measures re Egypt determined, believe it wise delay decision re further significant arms shipments to Israel. You requested approach French along these lines." (Telegram 382 to Paris, July 27; *ibid.*)

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14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Lima<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 28, 1956—12:43 a.m.*

Tedul 20. Eyes only Secretary from Acting Secretary. Following are salient events on Suez situation since our noon telephone call:<sup>2</sup>

1. Eden made strong plea to President for concerted action against Nasser, based upon broad principles of international interest, with stated willingness to back up with military force. (Eden message rpt Lima Tedul 18, July 27).<sup>3</sup> At conference with President this afternoon I pointed out grave dangers of engaging in military intervention on grounds outlined by Eden and that while strong position should be taken to preserve Western status in Middle East, I did not

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/7-2856. Top Secret; Niact.

<sup>2</sup> No account of this telephone conversation has been found in Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> Document 5.